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The relationship between bank capital and risk-taking is
one of the key issues in the banking literature. The minimum
capital standards advocated by the Basel Committee which are
sought to be implemented are premised on the rationale that
increased capital enhances bank safety. However, this premise
might often turn out to be less than relevant. By way of
example, increased capital might induce a bank to assume
greater risks. If this effect outweighs the buffer effect of
capital, highly capitalized bank might experience a higher
probability of failure. Such risk-taking behavior explains why
otherwise well-capitalized banks often experience significant
declines in their capital position. An offshoot of this* The views expressed and the approach pursued in the paper are entirely
personal.
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2214-8450/Copyright © 2014, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi. Production and hosrelationship is that capital regulation alone might not be suf-
ficient to ensure the soundness of the banking system.
Given the significance of these results, it is not surprising that
several researchers have attempted to dissect the relationship
between risk-taking and capitalization of banks. This literature
focuses on the well-known moral hazard problems in banking.
Merton (1977) shows that, given banks limited liability, they
might be inclined to decrease their capital and increase risk.
Other studies however, demonstrate that the relationship is not
necessarily negative if factors other than the option value are
considered (Besanko & Kantas, 1996; Hellmann, Murdock, &
Stiglitz, 2000; Kim & Santomero, 1988).
Akin to theoretical studies, empirical studies on this issue
also do not appear to have a consensus view. On the one hand,
several researchers (Boyd & Graham, 1996; Furlong, 1988;
Keeley, 1990) uncover a negative relationship between risk
and capitalization, others (Peek & Rosengren, 1997; Sheldon,
1995) find this relationship to be the opposite. One possible
reason for the lack of consensus among these various studies
could be the fact that they employ alternative risk measures as
dependent variables. In this process, they do not take on boardting by Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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talization and bank risk.
The aim of this paper is to push forward the empirical
literature by examining this issue for GCC banks. In particular,
we examine the relation between capital and risk for GCC
banks employing an extended sample period that encompasses
the recent financial crisis. Our study seeks to shed light on the
association between these two variables and how it was
affected during the financial crisis.
The GCC banking system provides a reasonable laboratory
to examine this issue in a holistic fashion. These countries
share similar economic and social characteristics and are
essentially dependent on a single primary commodity for ex-
ports. On average, hydrocarbon accounts for nearly half of the
region's GDP, contributes nearly 70% of these countries
merchandise exports and over three-fifths of government rev-
enues (IMF, 2013). Following the oil boom, real GDP growth
in these countries averaged over 6.5% during 2003e08 as
compared to less than 4% during the preceding five year
period. Non-oil GDP growth improved markedly, averaging
nearly 7.5% during this period (IMF, 2010a, 2010b, 2011).
The economic crisis and its after-effects, including the head-
winds of the Arab Spring slowed down these economies
considerably, with real GDP growth dwindling to 0.3% in
2009, although growth has since turned a corner, averaging
close to 6% during 2010e12 (IMF, 2013).1 The fiscal and
external positions also witnessed an upturn, providing head-
room to the authorities for greater economic diversification,
while allowing the surpluses to be invested for productive
purposes.
Besides the interest in the research question, the paper also
augments the literature in three distinct ways. First, we explore
whether the behavior of well-capitalized banks differ from
those that do not have adequate capital. Second, we examine
how market discipline interacts with regulatory pressure to
affect bank capital and risk-taking. Finally, we analyze the
differential response of Islamic banks as compared to con-
ventional banks on bank capital and risk.
As is well acknowledged, there are three entities that are
primarily involved in the risk determination of a bank: the
regulator, the shareholders and the management. Therefore, by
categorizing banks into different groups, we are able to better
understand which set of forces influence their risk-taking
behavior. More specifically, for inadequately capitalized
banks, it seems likely that regulatory forces will be paramount
in determining their risk-taking, since they are at greater risk
of failure. On the other hand, for well-capitalized banks, the
managers would have greater discretion in choosing risky
assets. Therefore, following the literature (Beatty & Harris,
1999; Ke, Petroni, & Saffieddine, 1999), we postulate that
managers' incentives dominate for publicly traded banks.
Finally, in case of Islamic banks, the interests of shareholders1 Much of the high growth during 2010e12 in the GCC countries can be
traced to the high GDP growth of Qatar, which grew at 16.6 and 13% during
2010 and 2011, respectively. Excluding Qatar, the average growth rate of GCC
during this period is around 4.7%.(as also depositors) would prevail, given the risk sharing
principles embedded in their behavior. Our dataset of GCC
banks contains a clear distinction along these lines and is
therefore well-suited to analyze these research questions.
We contribute to the literature in a few important ways.
First, to the best of our knowledge, this is one of the early
studies for GCC countries to examine the interlinkage between
capital and risk. Most studies that have focused on this aspect
are primarily based on US economy (Shrieves & Dahl, 1992)
or for other developed (Heid, Porath, & Stolz, 2004; Rime,
2001; Stolz, 2007) and emerging markets (Ghosh, Nachane,
Narain, & Sahoo, 2003; Godlewski, 2005). Even cross-
country studies on this aspect pertain primarily to developed
markets. Judged thus, we focus on a homogenous set of
countries in a region which share similar economic, social and
financial characteristics. Outside of the US, evidence for
Turkish banks appears to suggest that regulatory policies
exerted an uneven impact on the efficiency of commercial
banks during the 2002e10 period (Ozcan-Gunay, Gunay, &
Gunay, 2013).
Second, our paper extends the literature on ownership and
bank risk by focusing on the response of Islamic and com-
mercial banks for an extended period. Several studies
(Abedifar, Tarazi, & Molyneux, 2013; Hasan & Dridi, 2010)
suggest that there are no significant differences in the stability
of Islamic and conventional banks. Focusing on MENA
countries, Srairi (2013) finds that Islamic banks display a
lower exposure to credit risk as commercial banks. Whether
and to what extent do these findings carry over the periods of
crisis remains a moot question, which we empirically explore
in the present exercise. Employing an expanded cross-national
database, Imam and Kpodar (2013) uncover that per capita
income and greater integration with Middle East economies as
major factors that explain the rise of Islamic banking around
the globe.
Our paper also contributes to the literature that examines
the relevance of funding structure for bank risk. The pre-crisis
literature opined in favor of market funding, arguing that the
‘market discipline’ embedded in such funding coupled with its
relatively low cost could enable banks to fund their asset
expansion in a swift and cost-effective manner (Calomiris &
Kahn, 1991). The recent financial crisis has however
exposed the weaknesses of this argument. Huang and
Ratnovski (2011) for example, show that banks that relied
less on wholesale funding were able to better withstand the
impact of the crisis. Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Huizinga (2010)
found that banks' resilience on non-deposit funds increased
their risk. Other studies show that banks that relied heavily on
wholesale funds were more affected by the liquidity crunch,
experienced a large abnormal decline in their share prices
(Adrian & Shin, 2009; Raddatz, 2010). A parallel literature
focuses on corporate funding costs. For instance, using data
for 15 emerging markets over the period 1994e2004, Agca
and Celasun (2012) report that banking sector reforms lead
to lower corporate borrowing costs. This literature however,
does not focus on banks, which is one of the major concerns of
the paper.
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income structure for bank risk. The global trend
toward diversification of bank income sources has provided
banks with additional sources of revenue. While such diver-
sification, in principle, has helped foster stability in overall
income, it is not altogether clear whether this overt reliance on
non-interest income has helped to limit overall banking risk. In
general, studies tend to conclude that the greater reliance on
non-interest income does not lower earnings volatility in
earnings (Stiroh, 2004) or lower bank systematic risk (De
Jonghe, 2010). There is also evidence to suggest that diver-
sification might not necessarily be value enhancing: diversified
firms are found to trade at anywhere between 8 and 15%
discount as compared to specialized peers (De Long, 2001;
Laeven & Levine, 2007; Lang & Stulz, 1994).
The paper also adds to the literature that analyzes the impact
of the recent financial crisis. Several studies have examined the
behavior of U.S. banks during the crisis (Cornett, McNutt,
Strahan, & Tehranian, 2011; Huang, 2010; Ivashina &
Scharfstein, 2010; Santos, 2011) as well as for other coun-
tries, including Asia (Ree, 2011), African (Louis, Leonce, &
Taoufik, 2009), EU (Gardo & Martin, 2010) and GCC (IMF,
2010a) banking systems. Kilinc, Kilinc, and Turhan (2012)
explore the factors explaining the resilience of Turkish econ-
omy to the global crisis and find that proactive monetary and
fiscal response to be important factors.2 However, the interplay
between bank risk taking and capital and its interplay with the
crisis is an aspect that has not been investigated in prior
empirical research.
The rest of the analysis continues as follows. Section 2
provides an overview of the relevant literature. This is fol-
lowed by the database and variables employed in the study,
followed by the empirical strategy (Section 4), results (Section
5) and concluding remarks (Section 6).
2. Relevant literature
The literature on the relationship between bank capital and
risk can be classified into theoretical and empirical components.
As regards the former, Kim and Santomero (1988) have
observed that less risk-averse banks will prefer low levels of
capital. Such a negative relationship has been advocated by other
researchers as well (Diamond & Dybvig, 1986). A negative
relationship between risk and capital can also occur when all
deposits have a flat rate insurance, since in that case, themarginal
cost of increasing risk or lowering capital is insignificant.
The other line of thinking that contends a positive associ-
ation between bank capital and risk has emphasized the un-
intended effects of implementing minimum regulatory capital
standards. Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and
Santomero (1988) observe that constraints on a bank's2 Another literature considers the relevance of conventional risk manage-
ment models (e.g., VaR) across a large sample of developed and developing
countries during the crisis. The findings suggest that the performance of these
models was much less convincing for advanced economies (Koksal & Orhan,
2012).leverage due to minimum regulatory standards may cause
banks to view leverage and risk as substitutes. As a result, in
response to regulatory requirements, a bank that is forced to
lower its leverage might end up raising its risk level. As a
result, we will observe a positive relationship between bank
capital and risk for those banks that have levels of capital near
the minimum regulatory requirements.
Another line of argument derives from the fact that higher
capital requirements lower the charter value of banks, in turn,
compelling them to assume higher risks (Besanko & Kantas,
1996; Hellmann et al., 2000).3 An additional reason for the
positive capitalerisk relationship follows from the bankruptcy
cost avoidance hypothesis of Orgler and Taggart (1983). Ac-
cording to the authors, banks operating with high levels of
portfolio risk tend to hold higher capital levels due to the fact
that their probability of bankruptcy is higher.
Finally, the positive relationship between bank capital and
risk can also be traced to agency theories. For example,
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) hypothesize that man-
agers who do not own their bank equity are prone to take lower
risks, because they stand to lose much more when the bank
becomes insolvent.
Several empirical studies have tested the above hypotheses
on the relationship between changes in bank capital and
changes in risk. Most of those studies have employed data
from U.S. banks. In an early attempt, Shrieves and Dahl
(1992) emphasized the endogenous determination of a bank's
capital and risk. Within a simultaneous equations framework,
they found that the majority of banks mitigate the effects of
increases in capital by increasing exposure to asset risk.
Following from this research, several studies have investi-
gated the capitalerisk relationship, with mixed results. In case
of US, studies found that banks responded to the new capital
standards by increasing risk (Aggarwal & Jacques, 2001;
Jacques & Nigro, 1997). Rime (2001) offered similar evidence
for Switzerland, suggesting that regulatory pressure led banks
to increase their levels of capital. Flannery and Rangan (2006)
explain the capital build-up of US banks during the 1990s by
increased capital requirements such as the FDIC Improvement
Act, high profitability of the banking industry along with
higher risk levels, and the withdrawal of implicit government
guarantees. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) found that banks
which used the loan sales market for risk management pur-
poses held less capital and were more profitable but riskier
than other banks. This evidence is in line with the Froot and
Stein (1998) model that active risk management can allow
banks to hold less capital and to invest in riskier assets.
In contrast to this positive relation, several studies have also
reported an inverse relationship as well. For example, looking
at UK banks over 1998e2003, Alfon, Argimon, and
Bascunana-Ambros (2004) uncovered a negative relationship
between capital and risk in U.K. banks and building societies.
This contrasts with a previous study, which reports that banks3 Saunders and Wilson (2001) present evidence that charter value itself may
derive from high-risk activities, indicating that minimizing risk-taking also
would limit the value of the charter.
Table 1










Bahrain 11 20 11 7.8 243
Kuwait 6 9 14 9.3 139
Oman 6 0 5 13.3 80
Qatar 7 3 8 11.5 115
Saudi
Arabia
9 4 11 13.2 172
UAE 18 10 21 11.3 316
Total 57 46 70 10.3 1065
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mum capital standards. Other studies that report a negative
association include Rime (2001) for Swiss banks, Das and
Ghosh (2004) for Indian state-owned banks, Stolz (2007) for
German banks. Cross-country studies (Van Roy, 2008) also
report a negative association between capital and risk.
Another strand of the literature links risk taking to bank
ownership. This link is best exemplified by considering the
objective function of shareholders and the potential principal-
agent problems between shareholders and management. While
privately-owned banks tend to focus on profit maximization,
government-owned banks might have additional consider-
ations and not just profit maximization alone. Early research
on this aspect found that banks controlled by managers
exhibited lower risk as compared to those in which share-
holders had a controlling majority.
Beginning with the line of research, several authors have
investigated the interlinkage between ownership and bank risk.
On the one hand, cross-country studies consistently highlight
that higher government ownership could jeopardize bank sta-
bility (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002). For a large sample of European
banks, Ianotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2007) document that
government-owned banks are the least stable. Similarly, Cihak
and Hesse (2007) report that cooperative banks are more stable
as compared to commercial banks in OECD countries.
Saunders et al. (1990) and Laeven and Levine (2009) confirm
predictions of the theory that banks with large dominating
shareholders take larger risks. For European banks, Barry,
Lepetit, and Tarazi (2011) demonstrate that ownership struc-
ture is important in explaining risk differences in privately
owned banks. In a similar vein, Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi
(2013) report that government-owned banks have lower
default risk as compared to commercial banks. Unlike the
existing literature, our paper considers bank stability across
ownership types within GCC countries, holding constant the
institutional and macroeconomic framework.
In contrast to these studies, analyses examining the risk
behavior of Islamic banks are quite limited. Employing data
for 1993e2004 on OECD economies, Cihak and Hesse (2008)
document that small Islamic banks are more stable as
compared to similar-sized conventional banks. Subsequent
cross-country research (Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2010) appears to suggest lit-
tle difference in terms stability. Focusing primarily on the
MENA countries, Hasan and Dridi (2010) find that pre-crisis
profitability of Islamic banks to be higher than their conven-
tional counterparts, although these differences petered out
during the crisis, suggesting that higher pre-crisis profitability
of the former was not driven by excessive risk-taking.
Closer to the region, Khamis (2010) provides an overview
of the financial crisis on GCC countries. Al Hassan, Khamis,
and Oulidi (2010) analyze the banking sector in the GCC
economies, including trends in ownership, balance sheet ex-
posures and risks. Espinosa and Prasad (2010) analyze the
delinquent loans in GCC banks and finds that a decline in non-
oil GDP growth by 3 percentage points would raise NPLs byroughly 0.3%. Arvai, Prasad, and Katayama (2014) discuss the
macroprudential policies employed by GCC countries.
3. Database and variables3.1. DatabaseThe analysis employs a detailed bank-level dataset. The
core of the data is the information on bank's balance sheet and
income statement details as published by Bankscope, a
comprehensive, global database containing information on
nearly 30,000 public and private banks globally, maintained by
International Credit Analysis Limited (IBCA).
We use a sample comprising of an unbalanced panel of
annual report data from 1996 to 2011 for the GCC banking
system, comprising commercial and Islamic banks. The sam-
ple initially contained nearly 120 banks, but subsequently we
deleted the finance and investment companies, including in-
vestment banks, providing us with 112 banks. Several banks
also do not report data on the dependent variables employed in
the analysis, which we exclude from the sample. After this
filtering, we have observations on 103 banks at an average of
10.3 years of observations, yielding a maximum of 1065 bank-
years. To moderate the influence of outliers, we winsorized the
top and bottom 1% of observations for the dependent variable.
In 2011, the final year of the sample, these banks accounted,
on average, for roughly 75% of total banking assets in their
respective countries. Table 1 provides the sample composition,
while Table 2 describes the variable definitions, including
summary statistics.
The summary statistics suggest that, on average, banks are
well-capitalized with equity-to-asset in excess of 10%, the
regulatory minimum stipulated by most countries. Banks also
appear to exhibit high stability, as evidenced from their high Z-
scores. Contextually, it may be mentioned that in 2011, Z-
scores of banks in major developed economies such as US,
UK, Germany, France and Sweden ranged from a low of 0.9 in
UK to a high of 1.45 as in US (World Bank, 2013).
Among others, 15% of banks funding are short-term in na-
ture, although their cost-to-income are among the lowest. The
average bank is fairly small in size with high profitability levels,
close to 2% of total assets. These profitability numbers are
comparable to, and in some cases, even better than those
obtaining for advanced economies (see, for example, BIS, 2013).
Table 2
Variable definition and summary statistics.
Variable Definition Mean (SD) p.25 p.75
Dependent variables
CAP Capital/total asset 0.144 (0.202) 0 0.164
Z-score log(1 þ Z ), where Z ¼ (CAP þ RoA)/SD(RoA), where RoA ¼ return
on asset and SD(RoA) is the rolling standard deviation of RoA
based on observations in year t, t  1 and t  2
2.628 (1.065) 1.938 3.228
Control variables
Size Log (total asset) 6.475 (0.685) 6.027 6.995
RoA Profit/total asset 0.019 (0.058) 0.013 0.028
Loans Loans/total asset 0.515 (0.210) 0.403 0.658
Funding Short-term funding/total asset 0.144 (0.154) 0.031 0.207
Cost/income Cost-to-income ratio 0.300 (0.481) 0.000 0.432
Divers Index of income diversification, defined following Stiroh (2004) as
1 ðSH2NET þ SH2NONÞ, where SHNET ¼ NETNETþNON
SHNON ¼ NONNETþNON
NET ¼ net interest income; NON ¼ non-interest income
0.364 (0.131) 0.306 0.465
RPH Dummy ¼ 1 if for a bank the ratio of its regulatory to actual capital
belongs to the top 25 percentile of the distribution, else zero
0.255 (0.436) 0 1
RPL Dummy ¼ 1 if for a bank the ratio of its regulatory to actual capital
belongs to the bottom 25 percentile of the distribution, else zero
0.253 (0.435) 0 1
MREG Dummy ¼ 1 if a bank is listed, else zero 0.679 (0.467) 0 1
Islamic Dummy ¼ 1 if a bank is Islamic, else zero 0.447 (0.497) 0 1
Crisis Dummy ¼ 1 for 2009, else zero 0.061 (0.239) 0 1
149S. Ghosh / Borsa _Istanbul Review 14-3 (2014) 145e1573.2. Measurement of riskThere is limited consensus in the literature as to the mea-
surement of risk.4 Researchers have employed various risk
measures, such as risk-weighted assets to total assets (Avery &
Berger, 1991; Jacques & Nigro, 1997; Shrieves & Dahl, 1992;
Van Roy, 2008); non-performing loan ratio (Shrieves & Dahl,
1992), loan loss reserves (Altunbas, Carbo, Gardener, &
Molyneux, 2007), while more recent research employs the
Z-score (Barry et al., 2011; Bouwens & Verriest, 2014; Boyd
& Graham, 1988; Laeven & Levine, 2009). In our analysis,
consistent with recent research, we prefer to use the Z-score.
The Z-score indicates the distance from insolvency and com-
bines accounting measures of leverage, profitability and
volatility. As Barry et al. (2011) remark, the Z-score comprises
of two elements: the first component e RoA/SD(RoA) e
measuring asset risk and the second (K/A)/SD(RoA)
measuring leverage risk. A higher Z-score indicates that the
bank is more stable. Since the Z-score is positively skewed, we
use the natural logarithm of Z-score, which is normally
distributed (Laeven & Levine, 2009). As is well known, norms
for classification of delinquent loans differs markedly across
GCC countries (see, for example, World Bank, 2012). As a
result, we prefer not to employ the NPL variable or the loan
loss provisioning variable.4 Since all banks are not listed and most of their assets being not marketable,
it is difficult to compute the volatility for the market price of bank's assets.
Likewise, since all banks are not rated and have not received any external
support, computing sophisticated measures of risk are not possible.3.3. Measurement of capitalCapital is measured as the ratio of capital to asset. In effect,
total capital comprises of all the capital components permitted
under the relevant Acts in each country and is comparable to
the definition employed in the Basel accord.3.4. Control variablesIn the capital equation, the control variables include size and
profitability. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total
assets. Bigger banks are likely to be able to access equity mar-
kets more easily and therefore, expected to have lower capital
ratios. Alternately, given the concentrated banking systems that
typify these economies, larger banksmight be tempted to expand
faster to fund asset growth and therefore, need higher capital
levels. In the presence of asymmetric information, profitable
banksmight prefer to increase capital through retained earnings,
suggesting an expected positive sign on this variable.
In addition, we include two sets of interaction terms. The
firste CAPREG*CAP and CAPREG*DRISKe ascertains how
regulatory pressure responds to capital and changes in risk.
The capital pressure variable (CAP) is defined as the ratio
of capital ratio stipulated by the regulatory authorities in
respective countries to the bank's actual capital adequacy ratio,
a higher ratio implying greater regulatory pressure. The sec-
ond e MREG*CAP and MREF*DRISK e focuses on how
banks with market pressure respond to capital and risk.
The control variables in the risk equation include size,
funding, index of income profile, inefficiency and the inter-
action terms, akin to those earlier. Larger banks carry out a
wider set of activities, which should increase their ability to
5 The 3SLS methodology is sensitive to misspecification or measurement
errors. As a result, a comparison with 2SLS estimates as a specification check
becomes relevant. In the present case, estimation of equations (5) and (6) with
2SLS produces results similar to those obtained under 3SLS.
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greater dependence on wholesale funds are likely to be
perceived as more risky, as recent evidence would testify
(Raddatz, 2010). On the other hand, it is not evident whether
banks with diversified income stream are more or less risky,
since the empirical evidence, both for the U.S. and around the
world is mixed (Stiroh, 2004). Authors like Hughes, Lang,
Mester, and Moon (1994) and Kwan and Eisenbis (1997)
emphasize the importance of analyzing the impact of effi-
ciency on bank risk taking. Using data on US banks, they
uncover a negative relationship between inefficiency and bank
risk.
Besides, we include dummy to distinguish between Islamic
and conventional banks, in addition to a dummy for crisis. All
the specifications control for country and year shocks by
including an interaction term between country and year effects.
4. Empirical strategy
Following Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Van Roy (2008),
we employ the simultaneous equation setup wherein observed
changes in banks' capital and risk-taking consist of two
components, a discretionary adjustment and a change caused
by factors exogenous to the bank, as given by Eqs. (1) and (2).
DCAPb;t ¼ DCAPdb;t þ ub;t ð1Þ
DRISKb;t ¼ DRISKdb;t þwb;t ð2Þ
where DCAP and DRISK are the observed changes in capital
and risk levels, respectively, for bank b at time t. The DCAPdb,t
and DRISKdb,t variables are discretionary adjustments in capital
and risk and u and w are exogenous random shocks in capital
and risk levels, respectively.
Following Shrieves and Dahl (1992), the discretionary
changes in capital and risk is modeled using a partial adjust-











Substituting Eqs. (3) and (4) into Eqs. (1) and (2) and taking
on board the simultaneous capital and risk decisions, the











In effect, the observed changes in capital and risk are a
function of the target capital and risk levels, the lagged capital
and risk levels and any random shocks. The target capital and
risk levels are not directly observable, but are assumed to
depend on a set of observable variables describing the bank's
financial condition and country and year characteristics.The target capital ratio is assumed to depend on bank size,
measure of profitability, changes in risk (DRISK) and crisis,
ownership and regulatory dummies, as discussed earlier. The
variables used to proxy the target risk ratio are bank size,
income diversification index, funding profile and several
dummies, as discussed above.
Given the simultaneous equation setup of Eqs. (5) and (6),
the empirical strategy has to account for the endogeneity of the
regressors DCAP and DRISK. In contrast to the ordinary least
squares, 2SLS and 3SLS estimators take the endogeneity into
account, thereby producing consistent estimates. As Zellner
and Theil (1962) have observed, 3SLS exploits the informa-
tion that the disturbance terms in the two structural terms are
contemporaneously correlated and thereby ensures consistent
estimates.5 Since the estimates under the two models are
similar, we present the results using the 3SLS technique.
Before discussing the results, Table 3 sets out the descrip-
tive statistics of the dependent and independent variables, both
for the overall sample as well as for sub-samples, classified
according to ownership and listing. The results indicate that,
on average, Islamic banks are more stable (and therefore, less
risky) as compared to conventional banks, broadly consistent
with Cihak and Hesse (2008) who find large Islamic banks to
be less stable as compared to their conventional counterparts.
Profitability of Islamic banks is found to be half of those
obtaining for conventional banks, on average. Both these
differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In
contrast, the table suggests there are hardly any differences in
either profitability or stability for listed versus unlisted banks.
The results also indicate significant differences between Is-
lamic and conventional banks as also between listed versus
unlisted banks in terms of major characteristics such as size,
profitability, income composition, funding strategy and effi-
ciency levels. In particular, Islamic banks are smaller in size and
have less diversified income profiles as compared to conven-
tional banks (see, for example, Kamaruddin, Safa, & Mohd,
2008). On the other hand, listed banks are observed to be
bigger,more profitable,more diversified in terms of income, less
efficient and exhibit lower wholesale dependence. All these
differences are statistically significant at conventional levels.
Coming to regulatory pressure, conventional banks are
observed to face higher regulatory pressure as compared to
Islamic banks. The difference is statistically significant at the
0.05 level. In contrast, Islamic banks face lower regulatory
pressure as do listed banks. This suggests that given their
ability to access capital markets, listed banks encounter lower
regulatory pressure as compared to unlisted ones.
Stability of Islamic banks is higher during non-crisis pe-
riods, although their capital levels appear to be lower during
non-crisis times. This would imply that Islamic banks operate
on higher leverage, although profitability levels are not
significantly different across these two categories.
Table 3
Univariate tests of differences across bank characteristics.
Full sample Conventional
banks
Islamic banks Differences in
mean (t-test)
Listed banks Unlisted banks Differences in
mean (t-test)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A: dependent variable
Ln (1 þ Z ) 2.628 1.065 2.796 0.941 2.272 1.216 6.831*** 2.652 0.979 2.552 1.305 1.109
CAR 0.101 0.163 0.127 0.112 0.069 0.206 6.909*** 0.106 0.127 0.092 0.221 1.307
Panel B: independent variables
Size 6.476 0.685 6.631 0.608 6.134 0.722 10.995*** 6.563 0.617 6.188 0.808 6.775***
RoA 0.019 0.058 0.018 0.035 0.019 0.089 0.060 0.022 0.039 0.009 0.096 2.046**
Funding 0.144 0.154 0.148 0.135 0.136 0.189 1.002 0.125 0.123 0.207 0.215 5.752***
Divers 0.364 0.131 0.397 0.092 0.289 0.169 10.702*** 0.379 0.115 0.314 0.164 5.801***
Cost/income 0.300 0.481 0.315 0.205 0.281 0.683 1.307 0.320 0.424 0.258 0.582 2.192**
RPH 0.255 0.436 0.270 0.445 0.197 0.399 1.964** 0.262 0.439 0.232 0.424 0.759
RPL 0.253 0.435 0.201 0.401 0.454 0.499 5.789*** 0.209 0.407 0.419 0.495 4.881***
Panel C: non-crisis
Ln (1 þ Z ) 2.656 1.067 2.281 1.221 2.823 0.946 6.669*** 2.679 0.987 2.577 1.300 1.056
CAR 0.096 0.155 0.125 0.113 0.061 0.189 7.849*** 0.103 0.129 0.081 0.199 2.243**
Crisis
Ln (1 þ Z ) 2.362 1.017 2.479 0.829 2.221 1.198 1.223 2.355 0.839 2.377 1.342 0.084
CAR 0.177 0.245 0.158 0.083 0.200 0.355 0.782 0.139 0.086 0.262 0.414 1.636
151S. Ghosh / Borsa _Istanbul Review 14-3 (2014) 145e1575. Discussion of the results5.1. Baseline resultsThree sets of results are set out in Table 4. Specification 1
estimates the baseline model wherein adjustments in capital
and risk differ according to the extent of regulatory and market
pressure. Specification 2 allows for differential speeds of
adjustment in capital and risk. Finally, specification 3 addi-
tionally allows for differences in the coordination of capital
and risk adjustments.
We first discuss the control variables. Table 4 (Model 1)
indicates that bank size has a negative and significant effect on
capital. The negative effect on capital is in line with the
empirical literature and means that larger banks increase
capital by a magnitude that is lower as compared to smaller
banks. A possible explanation for this is that larger banks have
easier access to capital markets or alternately, they prefer to
undertake more monitoring rather than hold higher levels of
expensive capital (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Van Roy, 2008).
RoA has a highly statistically highly significant and positive
impact on capital, consistent with previous research that banks
with higher earnings can retain more capital (Aggarwal &
Jacques, 2001; Rime, 2001; Van Roy, 2008).6 This positive
relation is also consistent with the pecking order hypothesis,6 Note that capital satisfies the following identity:
Capital ¼ Capital=Risk weighted assets ðRWAÞ*RWA=Total assets ðTAÞ*TA
or, K ¼ R*P*TA, where K ¼ capital, R ¼ (Capital/RWA); P ¼ (RWA/TA). Re-
arranging and denoting bK ¼ DK=K, we obtain: bR ¼ bK  bP  cTA, suggesting
that the adjustment by banks to a change in risk-weighted capital can be
effected in three possible ways: (a) raise capital (increase K ); (b) lower risk
weighted assets (lower P) or (c) lower total assets.which supports the bank's preference for internal funding
owing to lower costs (Myers & Majluf, 1984).
In the risk equation, the coefficient on both Funding is
negative while that on Divers is positive. Both these co-
efficients are statistically significant. In other words, banks
with higher wholesale dependence exhibit lower stability (i.e.,
higher risk): a 1% increase in wholesale dependence lowers
bank stability by 0.8 percentage points. Banks with more
diversified income streams are observed to be less risky: a 1%
increase in income diversification lowers bank risk by 0.8
percentage points. Therefore, a 50% in income diversification
from 0.31 to 0.47 e equal to a move from the 25th to the 75th
percentile of the distribution e would lower bank risk by over
40% points (¼0.8*51 ¼ 41.2). The fact that bank funding
structures might be relevant in influencing bank risk-taking
has been acknowledged in recent empirical research (Adrian
& Shin, 2009; Raddatz, 2010; Ratnovski & Huang, 2009).
As regards the impact of regulatory pressure, the results in
model 1 suggest that, banks with high regulatory pressure
increase capital by less, than banks with high buffers, although
their response to risk appears to be limited. On the other hand,
banks with higher market pressure lower their capital and raise
risk as compared to those with no market pressure.
The parameter estimates of lagged capital and risk are
statistically highly significant, consistent with previous
research for the US (Jacques & Nigro, 1997) and elsewhere
(Das & Ghosh, 2004; Rime, 2001). The expected negative sign
lies in the [0,1] interval. Hence, these can be interpreted as
speed of capital and risk adjustments. In general, the speed of
capital adjustment is roughly 1.2e1.5 times higher than the
speed of risk adjustment. In Model 1, the coefficient on capital
adjustment is the highest (0.66); the corresponding coeffi-
cient on risk adjustment is 0.46. The estimated speeds of
Table 4
3SLS estimation of capital and risk.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DCAP DRISK DCAP DRISK DCAP DRISK
Control variables
Size 0.102 (0.012)*** 0.089 (0.067) 0.092 (0.012)*** 0.075 (0.068) 0.106 (0.012)*** 0.099 (0.069)
RoA 0.939 (0.184)*** 0.953 (0.178)*** 0.963 (0.182)***
Funding 0.852 (0.257)*** 0.817 (0.256)*** 0.831 (0.259)***
Divers 0.847 (0.297)*** 0.763 (0.298)*** 0.846 (0.299)***
Cost/income 0.099 (0.124) 0.099 (0.123) 0.092 (0.131)
Regulatory pressure
RPH 0.040 (0.014)*** 0.075 (0.078) 0.013 (0.036) 0.123 (0.215) 0.007 (0.038) 0.069 (0.216)
MREG 0.035 (0.014)*** 0.192 (0.081)*** 0.049 (0.019)*** 0.023 (0.198) 0.027 (0.021) 0.114 (0.201)
Adjustment coefficients
CAP (t  1) 0.662 (0.035)*** 0.491 (0.042)*** 0.539 (0.044)***
Risk (t  1) 0.455 (0.034)*** 0.430 (0.059)*** 0.456 (0.059)***
Response of endogenous variables
DCAP 0.651 (0.282)*** 0.653 (0.266)*** 0.683 (0.213)***
DRISK 0.006 (0.013) 0.005 (0.013) 0.084 (0.023)***
Interaction terms
RPH*CAP (t  1) 0.251 (0.229) 0.299 (0.238)
RPH*RISK (t  1) 0.075 (0.076) 0.057 (0.076)
MREG*CAP (t  1) 0.381 (0.064)*** 0.346 (0.066)***






Islamic 0.040 (0.015)*** 0.134 (0.089) 0.037 (0.015)*** 0.141 (0.091) 0.038 (0.015)*** 0.125 (0.089)
Crisis 0.003 (0.161) 0.342 (0.937) 0.057 (0.157) 0.363 (0.939) 0.002 (0.162) 0.245 (0.733)
Country*year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period 1996e2011 1996e2011 1996e2011 1996e2011 1996e2011 1996e2011
N. obs 683 683 683 683 683 683
R-squared 0.451 0.328 0.479 0.326 0.461 0.334
Standard errors in brackets.
***, *** and * Denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
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after 1.1 and 1.5 years, respectively. In essence, this implies
that the speeds of adjustment are quite high, mirroring the fact
that the average bank built up capital and risk over the
adjustment period; the latter at a rate slightly faster as
compared to the former. This is not surprising, given the rapid
loan growth experienced by these GCC economies prior to the
crisis.
As regards the response of endogenous variables, the
parameter estimate of DRISK in the capital equation is
insignificant, whereas the parameter estimate of DCAP in the
risk equation is positive and highly significant. Van Roy
(2008) also reports similar evidence for European and Cana-
dian banks in the cross-country study, although their US
sample banks did not exhibit any discernible response of either
capital or risk. The magnitude of the coefficient on DCAP
gradually increases as the specification is buttressed withadditional variables (see Models 1e3). In other words, after
controlling for differences in the coordination of capital and
risk adjustments, increases in capital is associated with
decrease in risk, consistent with evidence obtaining for Japa-
nese banks (Van Roy, 2008). In Model 3, the standardized beta
coefficient suggests that an increase in capital by one standard
deviation would lower risk by 0.11 standard deviation.
While the coefficient on the interaction term of RPH with
lagged capital and risk variables are insignificant, the coeffi-
cient on MREG*Cap (t  1) is negative and statistically sig-
nificant in Models 2 and 3, indicating that banks facing market
discipline adjust capital thrice as fast as compared to banks
with no such discipline.
Further, we find that the estimated coefficients on
RPH*DRISK is significant and positive, while the estimated
coefficient of RPH*DCAP is significant, positive and nearly
four times larger than the coefficient on DCAP. This finding
153S. Ghosh / Borsa _Istanbul Review 14-3 (2014) 145e157indicates that capital and risk adjustments are negatively
correlated for banks with high regulatory pressure. These
positive coefficients are in line with recent evidence for US
market (Shim, 2010). The impact of the regulatory pressure
variable is extremely large. To see this, consider a bank with
DCAP equal to 0.0003, the average for the sample. Ignoring
the impact of RPH, the point estimates in Model 3 indicate
that an increase in DCAP by the mean value would increase
stability (i.e., lower DRISK) by 0.0002 (¼0.683*0.0003)
percentage points. Taking RPH into account, the point esti-
mates in Model 3 yield an estimate of 0.0008
(¼2.623*0.0003) percentage points, nearly 300% higher as
compared to without RPH.
Looking at ownership, when significant, the coefficient on
Islamic is positive and significant in the DCAP equation,
indicating that, after controlling for bank specific and country-
year characteristics, changes in capital are higher for Islamic
as compared to conventional banks. The effect is quantita-
tively important, indicating that capital increase for the
average Islamic bank is roughly 0.04 percentage points higher
as compared to an average conventional bank. Considering the
average capital change in the sample however, this is not a
sizeable difference.5.2. Robustness checksWe undertake several robustness checks of the baseline
results. First, following Van Roy (2008), we analyze the
marginal effect that market discipline has on the relationship
between regulatory pressure and DCAP and between regula-
tory pressure and DRISK. As observed by Jacques and Nigro
(1997), banks with capital above or below the regulatory
capital standards might respond in a different manner to the
regulatory standards. Banks with capital below the stipulated
standards will be under considerable pressure to improve
capital ratios, by either increasing capital or by lowering risk
weighted assets. On the other hand, banks with higher-than-
stipulated capital levels might reduce their capital or in-
crease portfolio risk. Taking these considerations on board, we
separately analyze for each of these two bank categories the
impact on capital and risk.
Second, we explore the impact of crisis on bank behavior,
classified according to their capital levels. Intuitively, the crisis
increased the quantum of delinquent loans, necessitating an
increase in provisioning and thereby putting pressure on banks'
capital and in particular, more on those banks with low levels
of capital. How this interaction played out remains an open
question (Table 5).
Finally, we examine the differential response of Islamic
banks to changes in capital and risk, and in particular, how it
evolved during the crisis. Observers have contended that the
positive features embedded in these banks, including the close
link between financial transactions and productive flows and
the built-in dimensions of governance and risk management
appeared to have cushioned them from the worst of the crisis
(Akthar Aziz, 2009; Yilmaz, 2009). Whether and to whatextent it impacted their capital and risk behavior remains to be
empirically analyzed.
All regressions include the full set of controls and
dummy variables, but these are not reported for purposes of
brevity.
In Model 1, the coefficients on all three variables e
RPH*(1  MREG), RPH*MREG and (1  RPH)*MREG e
are statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the DCAP
model. Take for example, RPH*(1  MREG). The coefficient
is negative in the DCAP equation with a point estimate 0.08.
Ceteris paribus, banks which faced high regulatory pressure
but no market pressure lowered their capital ratio by 0.08
percentage points more than banks that did not experience
either form of pressure. Similar evidence is obtained for the
other two interaction terms. In effect, this suggests that banks
which experienced both regulatory and market pressures or for
that matter, banks experiencing only market pressure and not
regulatory pressure, lowered their capital ratios. However, the
size of the effect in all cases is not very large, ranging from
0.05 to 0.09 percentage points.
On the other hand, as regards banks facing low regulatory
pressure, the evidence indicates that, irrespective of whether
they encountered market pressures or not, they increased their
capital ratios. By way of example, banks experiencing both
low regulatory and market pressure improved their capital by
0.1 percentage points, on average, as compared to those not
facing any such pressures.
The evolution of regulatory and market pressures was,
however, quite different during the crisis. The evidence ap-
pears to suggest that banks facing high regulatory pressure, but
no market pressures raised their risk levels during the crisis,
although there was no perceptible impact on their capital. On
the other hand, banks facing low regulatory pressure, but no
market pressure raised capital levels during the crisis. In
essence, during the crisis, inadequately capitalized banks
raised risks perhaps in order to garner market shares, whereas
well-capitalized banks further buttressed their capital posi-
tions, indicating an asymmetry in their risk and capital ad-
justments. This is broadly consistent with the data which
suggests that overall capital adequacy of banks in these
countries has increased significantly after the crisis (IMF,
2013).
Finally, focusing on ownership, the evidence appears to
suggest that Islamic banks increased their risk in response to
an increase in capital (Model 4). The effect was also manifest
during the crisis as well, wherein these banks further raised
their risks. The effect of the crisis variable is quite large. To
see this, consider the difference between an average Islamic
bank and an average conventional bank when DCAP equals
0.00003, the average for the sample. Ignoring the impact of
crisis, the point estimates in Col (6) yield an estimate of
0.002% points (¼6.672*0.0003 ¼ 0.002). Taking into
account the crisis impact, the point estimates in Col (8) yield a
difference of approximately 0.6% points (¼6.672*0.0003 
0.655 ¼ 0.6). In contrast, the estimates in Model 4 indicate
that there is no perceptible impact on capital of risk-taking by
Islamic banks.
Table 5
3SLS estimation of capital and risk e robustness.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DCAP DRISK DCAP DRISK DCAP DRISK DCAP DRISK
RPH*(1  MREG) 0.083 (0.032)*** 0.154 (0.181)
RPH*MREG 0.085 (0.021)*** 0.128 (0.126)
(1  RPH)*MREG 0.052 (0.017)*** 0.081 (0.103)
RPL*(1  MREG) 0.229 (0.027)*** 0.008 (0.154)
RPL*MREG 0.115 (0.022)*** 0.043 (0.134)
(1  RPL)*MREG 0.016 (0.018) 0.155 (0.109)
RPH*(1  MREG)*crisis 0.004 (0.094) 1.063 (0.488)**
RPH*MREG*crisis 0.025 (0.084) 0.445 (0.505)
(1  RPH)*MREG*crisis 0.024 (0.076) 0.338 (0.459)
RPL*(1  MREG)*crisis 0.364 (0.081)*** 0.086 (0.489)
RPL*MREG*crisis 0.043 (0.035) 0.091 (0.058)





DCAP 1.128 (0.316)*** 1.136 (0.293)*** 1.221 (0.316)*** 6.533 (1.674)***
DRISK 0.047 (0.055) 0.065 (0.054) 0.035 (0.055) 0.193 (0.715)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period 1996e2011 1996e2011 1996e2011 1996e2011 1996e2011 1996e2011 1996e2011 1996e2011
N. obs 683 683 683 683 683 683 914 914
R-squared 0.405 0.142 0.441 0.141 0.437 0.143 0.452 0.228
Standard errors in brackets.
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significant and negative impact on bank risk, and not vice
versa, consistent with our baseline estimates.
6. Concluding remarks
The role of minimum capital requirements in the context of
modern banking regulation has been a widely discussed and
debated topic in the literature. Efforts are underway by the Basel
Committee to devise capital regulations consistent with banks'
risk profile and business strategies (BCBS, 2012). However,
whether and to what extent does higher capital level encourage
or dissuade risk-taking by banks remains an empirical question.
While there are several studies that examine this aspect for
emerging and advanced economies, either from a country-
specific context or from a cross-country standpoint, the evi-
dence on this aspect for GCC banks is admittedly limited. Given
that these countries are planning to implement the Basel III
standards and are primarily bank-based economies, an analysis
of the relationship between risk and capital for these economies
remains an unaddressed area of research.
In this context, the present paper employs data on an
extended sample of GCC banks to examine this issue in detail.
Three major findings emerge. First, banks generally lower
capital in response to an increase in risk, and not vice versa.
Second, there is an uneven impact of regulatory pressure and
market discipline on banks attitude toward risk and capital.
And third, Islamic banks increased their capital as compared to
conventional banks.
These findings have useful implications for policy formu-
lation. First, the positive relationship from capital to risk
suggests that capital regulation alone may not be enough to
ensure bank soundness and would need to be complemented
with additional regulatory instruments. Secondly, the negative
relationship between regulatory pressure and market discipline
for banks with low-capital suggests that there is a need for
closer and continuous monitoring. One possible way could be
to give priority to risk-based supervision as a way to prevent
those banks from gambling in excessively risky strategies.
Third, the analysis suggests that ownership matters for bank
capital. Importantly as well, the evidence points to risk taking
by Islamic banks, especially during the crisis. Given the quasi-
equity of Islamic banks in the form of mudarabah saving and
investment (S&I) deposits, such risk-taking does not appear to
have made a significant dent on their capital position. How-
ever, given the limited opportunities for diversification for
Islamic banks in these economies, it becomes important to
carefully monitor their capital position, especially in times of
stress. Finally, the analysis makes an explicit distinction be-
tween changes in capital and risk brought about by not only
regulatory, but also market pressures. Not much is known as to
how market pressure interacts with regulatory pressure in
influencing capital and/or bank risk-taking. This interaction of
market pressure with regulatory pressure and its effect on
capital is also important in light of the fact that minimum
capital requirements and market discipline constitute two of
the three pillars of the New Basel Accord.References
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